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Tucker: The Tender Years Presumption in Child Custody Determinations: J.

THE TENDER YEARS PRESUMPTION IN
CHILD CUSTODY DETERMINATIONS:
J. B. v. A. B.
The traditional common law rule to determine parental custody of minor children was that only the father is entitled by law
to custody and control of his children.' Around the turn of the
century this rule began to be replaced, at least in theory, by the
more flexible rule that it is the child's best interest, and not the
primary right of either parent, which is the determinative factor
in child custody proceedings.' West Virginia adopted this rule stating "the welfare of an infant is the polar star by which the court is
to be guided in the exercise of its discretion. ' 3 In actual practice,
however, the court has moved from a position entirely favoring the
father to an equally rigid presumption that the mother is the natural custodian of a child of tender years-the "tender years" or
"maternal preference" presumption.' Implicit in the language of
custody cases in West Virginia is that "a mother's natural love,
affection and care for a child of tender years is essential to the
welfare of the child."5 Thus while in legal theory mothers have
merely obtained an equal right to custody, in practice they will
always prevail over the father absent a showing of extreme maternal unfitness. 6 This presumption places a double burden of proof
on the father: not only must he show that he can provide a better
environment for the children, he must also present sufficient evidence to show that the mother is so unfit that an award of custody
to her will detrimentally affect the children.7
West Virginia's continuing adherence to this rule is evidenced
by the supreme court decision in J. B. v. A. B.8 In perpetuating a
presumption which serves as a substitute for the factual weighing
of the relative merits of the parents, the court stated:
While this Court has carefully evaluated the arguments in favor
of determining the relative competence of each parent for child
Annot., 70 A.L.R.3d 262 (1976).
2

Id.
Green v. Campbell, 35 W. Va. 698, 702, 14 S.E. 212, 214 (1891).
Funkhouser v. Funkhouser, 216 S.E.2d 570 (W. Va. 1975).

Id. at 574.
Foster and Freed, Child Custody, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 423 (1964).
Note, The Father'sRight to Child Custody in InterparentalDisputes,49 TuL.

L. Rav. 189 (1974).
8 242 S.E.2d 248 (W. Va. 1978).
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custody on the evidence which each parent produces at a hearing, and awarding custody on that basis, the Court unanimously rejects any rule which makes the award of custody dependent upon relative degrees of parental competence rather
than the simple issue of whether the mother is unfit?
In J. B. v. A. B. the contending parties, though alleging cruelty as the grounds for divorce, nevertheless presented evidence
tending to show that both gave their daughter, aged five, the affection and care she required. Additionally, the evidence established
aggravated strife between the parties and one isolated incidence of
sexual misconduct on the part of the wife. The trial court awarded
custody to the father, apparently following the rule that when
marital misconduct is.the grounds for the divorce, the law generally favors the award of custody to the innocent spouse.'" On appeal, the court specifically rejected this rule as violating the tender
years presumption, and remanded the case to the lower court with
directions to award custody to the mother in accordance with the
tender years rule. The court emphatically rejected the contentions
that the presumption is unconstitutional and inconsistent with the
best interests of the child.
The court bases its decision on its selection of "factors which
militate in favor of the presumption and against the available
alternatives."" These factors include what the court considers to.
be the socialization patterns of the current parental generation
that encourage women to develop attitudes peculiarly suited to
raising children,' 2 the infrequency of reversal of the traditional
roles of mother and father, the natural biological ties resulting in
emotional and physical dependency on the mother, and the need
for a definite standard and a predictable result.
The tender years presumption was founded upon the traditional, romantic view of motherhood. Yet the essential experience
for the child is that of "mothering"-the warmth, consistency, and
continuity of the relationship-which is not dependent on the sex
of the parent. The view that only females can effectively perform
the mothering function is based upon the stereotypical thinking of
an earlier time. It is the performance of the mothering function
IId. at 252.

,oRohrbaugh v. Rohrbaugh, 136 W. Va. 708, 722, 68 S.E.2d 361, 369 (1951).
" 242 S.E.2d at 253.
12 "[Alttitudes such as surpassing patience and a high tolerance for a close,
grating, aesthetically unpleasant, and frequently oppressive, yet nonetheless abso-

lutely indispensible physical relationship with children." Id. at 252.
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which fosters healthy development and which is in the best interests of the children. The objectives of custody provisions can be
accomplished by a person of either sex. 3
Competing interests of the state, the child, and the parent
demand an objective inquiry into the relative parental competence
of both the male and the female. The existing doctrine not only
fails to effectuate the interests of the state or child, it serves as an
excuse for not inquiring into either of these interests." What
should be an objective inquiry emerges instead as a battle between
attorneys to demonstrate the unfitness of the opposing spouses.
While the court repeatedly asserts that the "first and overriding
principle in child custody cases is the welfare of the children,"' 5 in
refusing to base the award on a factual determination of parental
competence, the court violates its own command. By concluding
that the mother is "the true friend and owner of the child,"" the
child is in a sense relegated to the position of a chattel, to be
awarded to the mother by right of ownership.
The court justifies the use of the presumption on the grounds
that it "will achieve greater justice over a wider spectrum of cases
than the alternative of endless hearings" 7 and that it provides
a definite standard and a predictable result. Yet the tender years
presumption operates to the exclusion of any other legal criteria or
relevant factual evaluations." It seems neither necessary nor useful
to infer in advance that the best interests of the child are better
served by awarding custody to the mother rather than the father,
and the child's long-range interest will be best protected by making a determination "under the whole record which parent can
minister more effectively" to those interests. 9 The interests of all
the parties are best served by fact-finding in a particular case
without sexual preconceptions of any kind, by unbiased considera11Psychologists and anthropologists today agree that both parents are equally
able to care for a child. See, g.g., Margaret Mead, Some Theoretical Considerations

of the Problem of Mother-Child Separation, 24 Am. J. OF ORTHOPSYCHUTRY 24
(1954); L. Yarrow, Maternal Deprivation: Toward an Empirical and Conceptual
Reevaluation, 58 PSYCHOLOGICAL BuLL. 459 (1961).
" Note, Pennsylvania Child Custody: The Tender Years Doctrine- Reason or
Excuse?, 81 DICK. L. REv. 775 (1977).
's 242 S.E.2d at 251.
Cariens v. Cariens, 50 W. Va. 113, 118, 40 S.E. 335, 337 (1901).

"

'7
"

242 S.E.2d at 254.

See, e.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 564 P.2d 71 (Alaska 1977), cert. denied, 98 S.

Ct. 896 (1978).
1,In re Marriage of Bowen, 219 N.W.2d 683, 687-88 (Iowa 1974).
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tions on the basis of individual characteristics and relationships
between parent and child.?
The court states the presumption in conflicting language with
the result that no clear rule emerges. On the one hand, the court
asserts that the presumption arises and the mother prevails only
upon a finding of "other things being equal."'" On the other hand,
the court also asserts that the mother prevails unless shown to be
unfit.2 In the large middle area where the father is more capable
but the mother not wholly unfit, the varying formulations produce
opposite results. If the court, in fact, means to require an initial
determination of "equality," the next logical step would be to proceed to a determination "under the whole record which parent can
minister more effectively to the . . .best interests of the chil-

dren." 21The ability to make such a determination is demonstrated
by the experience of other jurisdictions which suggest that the
following factors be considered: the characteristics and needs of
the child; the characteristics and home environment of each parent; the ability of each parent to provide for the material, social,
moral and emotional needs of the child; available alternatives
(custody to a third person); the emotional ties of each parent to
the child and of the child to each parent; the desirability of continuing an existing child-parent or24 third party relationship; and
finally, the preference of the child.
The Supreme Court of the United States, in Stanley v.
Illinois, struck down a similar presumption made by the Illinois
court that unwed fathers, unlike unwed mothers, were unfit to
raise children.? The tender years presumption, like the Illinois
presumption, does not require the unfitness of the father, in fact,
Watts v. Watts, 77 N.Y. Misc.2d 178, 350 N.Y.S.2d 285 (1973).
242 S.E.2d at 250. See also court syllabus point 1.
242 S.E.2d at 250. See also court syllabus point 2.
13 In re Marriage of Bowen, 219 N.W.2d 683, 687-88 (Iowa 1974).
24 Id.; Johnson v. Johnson, 564 P.2d 71 (Alaska 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct.
896 (1978).
405 U.S. 645 (1972). In Stanley, the parents of three children had lived
together intermittently for eighteen years but had never married. Upon the death
of the mother, dependency proceedings were held, in which the children were declared wards of the state and placed with court-appointed guardians. (Illinois law
declared children of unwed fathers became wards of the state upon the death of
their mother.) The father appealed, arguing that denial of custody without a showing of unfitness was a denial of equal protection, since Illinois law required married
fathers and unwed mothers to be shown unfit before being deprived of their children.
2
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to be shown by the mother, because it will be presumed at law. By
preferring the mother, regardless of how fit the father is, the court
assumes that he is not as fit as the mother to care for the children.
The court disregards evidence of the superior parental competence
of the father so long as he does not introduce sufficient proof of his
spouse's unfitness. The answer to why the courts prefer such a
"mechanical formula," if indeed it can be called a formula, is
suggested by the Supreme Court in Stanley: "Procedure by presumption is always cheaper and easier than individualized determination. But when, as here, the procedure forecloses the determinative issues of competence and care, when it explicitly disdains
present realities

. . .

, it needlessly risks running roughshod over

the important interests of both parent and child."2
The West Virginia court in J. B. v. A. B. justifies its use of
the presumption "on the grounds that the presumption will
achieve greater justice over a wider spectrum of cases." Yet, in
Stanley, the United States Supreme Court rejects rigid categories
based on presumptions of unfitness: because so few may be fit does
not release the state from its obligations of inquiry into particular
cases, even at the risk of undergoing administrative inconvenience.
The "Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency."
The West Virginia statute on child custody29 appears to take
a neutral stance in regard to which party may obtain custody.
Similarly, the statute on guardians and wards specifically instructs the court that as between the mother and the father, it
should appoint "that parent who is, in the court's opinion, best
suited for the trust, considering the welfare and best interests of
such minor child or children."3 In a case involving this statute, the
court stated
this statutory provision is in recognition of the modem and
more conscionable conception that there is parity of interest in
the parents concerning the welfare of their children; that the
natural love and affection of each toward the children should
be recognized and not that the mother should be discriminated
3
against in favor of the father as under the old rule. '
n Id. at 656-57.
242 S.E.2d at 254.
405 U.S. at 656.
W. VA. CODE § 48-2-15 (1976 Replacement Vol.).
' W. VA. CODE § 44-10-7 (Cum. Supp. 1978).
31Settle v. Settle, 117 W. Va. 476, 479, 185 S.E. 859, 861 (1936) (emphasis
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Just as "civilization, advanced thought, and human kindness"
persuaded the courts to retreat from the iron rule that only a father
had the right to custody and to recognize that the rule led to
discrimination against the mother," so should it now lead the court
to recognize that there is equality of parental capacity between
male and female and that the best interests of the child are not
served by the current discrimination against the father.
There are compelling reasons why the court should abandon
a presumption based upon outdated notions. A rule developed in
an environment in which the woman's occupation was chiefly
homemaking is no longer appropriate in a society where more than
forty percent of all married women are employed." It is illogical
to award custody to the mother based upon her role of "mothering"
while failing to realize that upon the granting of the divorce she
must, as a matter of practical necessity, assume both parental
roles, unless she immediately remarries or resides with her parents
so that a male assumes the father role in her place. Therefore, the
test should not be "motherhood," but should instead be based
upon a realistic consideration of all the facts in the case.
Despite the court's assertions, there is a lack of scientific basis
for the tender years presumption. 4 "The prenatal tie of a child to
its mother is biological, but after its birth the tie is socially and is
culturally prescribed."" As society and culture are changing, so
should the courts change-it is no longer adequate for the court to
generalize that all women are more capable and better suited to
"mothering" than men are. It is no longer permissible to deny the
father an objective determination of his fitness on the facts simply
because the use of presumptions may be more expedient2
added). Here, the court recognized that a rule allowing only the father to obtain
custody was outdated and no longer applied to every case. Because both parents
demonstrated love, affection and caring for the child, and since it would be harsh
to deny custody to either, the court awarded custody to the mother from September
1 through May 31, the remainder of the year to the father.
Cariens v. Cariens, 50 W. Va. 113, 118, 40 S.E. 335, 337 (1901).
" Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 689 n. 23 (1973).
31 See, e.g., Lott, Who Wants the Children?, 28 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 573, 581
(1973); Margaret Mead, Some Theoretical Considerations of the Problem of
Mother-Child Separation, 24 AM. J. OF ORTHOPSYCHiATRY 24 (1954); L. Yarrow,
Maternal Deprivation: Toward an Empirical and Conceptual Reevaluation, 58
PSYCHOLOGICAL BuLL. 459 (1961); Note, The Father'sRight to Custody in Interpar.

ental Disputes, 49 TuL. L. REv. 189 (1974).
1 Lott, Who Wants the Children?, 28 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 573, 581 (1973).
31 Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
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Although the court unequivocally states that equal protection
analysis under any applicable state or federal standard would find
the presumption of maternal preference to be constitutional, 3 recent federal decisions suggest otherwise.38 Not only can the custody
statute be attacked on the basis of its objective of "expediency,"
but the common law tender years presumption may be rendered
unconstitutional by its gender-based classification denying equal
protection to the father.
In Reed v. Reed, the United States Supreme Court held that
even though a state's interest may be legitimate, "[t]o give a
mandatory preference to members of either sex over members of
the other, merely to accomplish the elimination of hearings on the
merits, is to make the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice
forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment."39 When a statute provides for different treatment
based on sex, it establishes a classification subject to scrutiny
under the equal protection clause. In establishing the degree of
scrutiny for sex-based discrimination, the Court in Reed v. Reed
appeared to select a middle ground somewhere between the rational basis test and that of strict scrutiny. To withstand the constitutional test, the classification "must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair
" 242 S.E.2d at 252.
u Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411
U.S. 677 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71
(1971).
3' 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971). In Reed, when their minor son died intestate, the
adoptive parents, then separated, each petitioned the Idaho probate court to be
appointed administrator of his estate. The probate court appointed the father in
accordance with an Idaho statute providing that when several persons claim to be
equally entitled to be appointed, the male applicant must be preferred to the
female. The mother appealed to an Idaho district court which held the statute to
be in violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment and
returned the case to the probate court with instructions to make the appointment
based upon the relative capabilities of the applicants. Meanwhile, the father appealed directly to the Idaho Supreme Court, which reversed the district court,
stating the purpose of the statute was to resolve more easily such disputes without
going to the merits of the applicants. "The Legislature, when it enacted the statute
evidently concluded that in general men are better qualified to act as an administrator than are women ... [W]e are not prepared to say that it is so completely
without a basis in fact as to be irrational and arbitrary" finding that the different
treatment based on gender was not so arbitrary as to be unconstitutional. 93 Idaho
511, 514, 465 P.2d 635, 638 (1971). The United States Supreme Court held the
objective of reducing work load, though legitimate, was inconsistent with equal
protection.
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and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all
persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike." ' ,
Sex is an immutable characteristic determined, like race and
nationality, by the accident of birth. It frequently bears no relationship to a person's ability to perform or contribute to society.
For these reasons in Frontiero v. Richardson a Supreme Court
plurality appears to abandon the middle ground and asserts that
classification based on sex is "inherently suspect, and must therefore be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny."" Yet regardless of the
particular level of scrutiny that is applied, the tender years presumption seems unlikely to survive. If the objective of the West
Virginia custody statute is in fact to protect the best interests of
the child, it is unsupportable under any test for the court to impose
a gender-based discrimination resting upon no sound basis at all.
As the court states in J. B. v. A. B., the majority of jurisdictions continue to apply the tender years presumption, "echoing the
familiar rationale that the mother is the natural custodian of her
young, and that her love for her child is irreplaceable."" A growing
number of jurisdictions, however, have concluded that the presumption is no longer a viable alternative to a judicial determination of parental competency based upon all the facts of a a particu3
lar case.
," 404 U.S. at 76. See also, Note, The Tender Years Presumption: Do the
Children Bear the Burden?, 21 S.D. L. REv.332 (1976), for a lengthy discussion on
which constitutional test is to be applied to gender-based discrimination cases.
" 411 U.S. 677, 688 (1973). Under federal law, a female member of the uni-

formed services seeking to obtain an increase in housing and medical benefits for
her spouse must prove his dependency in fact, whereas no such burden is imposed
upon male members of the services. Frontiero, a female member of the services
brought suit, claiming a denial of equal protection.
42 242 S.E.2d at 252, n. 2.
42 Johnson v. Johnson, 564 P.2d 71 (Alaska 1977), cert. denied, 98 S. Ct. 896
(1978) (not reaching the constitutional argument, but concluding that the tender
years doctrine was not "an appropriate criterion" for determination of the best
interests of the child); In re Marriage of Bowen, 219 N.W.2d 683 (Iowa 1974) (not
reaching the issue of constitutionality but finding that the interests of all parties
were best served by an analysis of all the facts in each case); Ettinger v. Ettinger,
72 N.M. 300, 383 P.2d 261 (1963)(finding the rule of tender years unsound in that
it distorted the relationship of motherhood as a factor in the determination of the
best interests of the child and hampered the courts in weighing all of the evidence
in a case); Watts v. Watts, 77 Misc.2d 178, 350 N.Y.S.2d 285 (1973) (overruling the
tender years presumption as being inconsistent with the best interests of the child
as well as unconstitutional).
ALAsKA STAT. § 09.55.205 (Cum. Supp. 1977) ("Neither parent is entitled to
preference as a matter of right in awarding custody of the child"); FLA. STAT. §
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The West Virginia court can no longer justify the continued
use of a doctrine which has ceased to fulfill the purpose for which
it was intended. The doctrine is based on societal values from a
bygone era, reflective of the romantic ideal that only the mother
could provide warmth, softness, love and caring, and the view that
fathers were synonymous with harsh discipline, hard muscles, and
breadwinning. Just as the courts recognized in the past that the
old common law rule discriminated against the mother, so should
this court now recognize that the present rule equally discriminates against the father.
In J. B. v. A. B. the court failed to refute a presumption which
obscures the basic tenet of the best interests of the child. In so
doing, the court refuses to recognize that the real issue-which
parent will do better in raising the child-can only be resolved by
factually evaluating all of the evidence in each case.
Vicki Obenchain Tucker
61.13(2) (1971)("the father of the child shall be given the same considerations as
the mother in determining custody"); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 70 (McKinney
1977)("there shall be no prima facie right to the custody of the child in either
parent"); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 247.24(3) (West Cum. Supp. 1978) ("in determining the
parent with whom a child shall remain, the court shall consider all facts in the best

interest of the child and shall not prefer one parent over the other solely on the basis
of the sex of the parent").
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